

the term. The colonial office, thinking first and foremost of possible instability in its territories, hardly needed the addition of cold war factors to press the cabinet to initiate financial arrangements, trade deals, and permission to accept a limited number of Japanese businessmen to first visit and then resettle abroad. Malayan reconstruction, for example, required Japanese investment in its iron mining that in turn was vital to the rebuilding of Japan's own steel industry. There were, therefore, important Anglo-Japanese commonalities in South-East Asia, despite the reluctance of both Labour and Conservative governments in the 1950s to rush their fences and be seen to be too welcoming to Japan, even when it was being depicted as part of a US-sponsored Western front in Asia.

The position, however, was further complicated by the fears of British manufacturing interests that something akin to pre-war trade competition was in the offing. Tomaru heaps a great deal of criticism on the board of trade for supporting domestic fears of Japan, while being somewhat reluctant to underline the not-infrequent crassness of Japanese views of South-East Asia that appear to have altered only slowly from pre-war days (p. 227). The fact that both the Japanese government and private industry might dispatch individuals with known complicity in the wartime occupation of Malaya to return to positions of responsibility in the 1950s was hardly suggestive of any major change of heart.

The book provides a most valuable account of British dealings with Japan over pre-independent Malaya and has an interesting coda on what happened after the Europeans went home. Perhaps Tomaru can be persuaded next to tell the full story of more recent Malay-Japanese ties, assuming that some future coalition cabinet in Japan is brave enough to release the full files.

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NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES. *Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa and US-Japanese Relations*. College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 2000. Pp. xxiii, 246. \$34.95 (us).

THE UNITED STATES'S relationship with Okinawa has been a crucial, if poorly understood, aspect of US-Japanese relations. For twenty-seven years, from 1945 to 1972, Okinawa, once a part of Japan, was a US colony, administered by the US army. Nicholas Evan Sarantakes seeks to explain why the United States decided to rule Okinawa and why, in the end, the US government returned the island to Japan. While his book is 'primarily a study of US foreign policy' (p. xx) and of bureaucratic politics in Washington, it devotes considerable space to the interaction between American rulers and their Okinawan subjects and to the role Okinawa played in Japanese politics. The result is a detailed, intelligent book, based on impressive research in primary sources, that illuminates many aspects of the triangular relationship between the United States, Okinawa, and Japan.

It was perhaps inevitable that, given the bloody invasion of Okinawa in the

spring of 1945, the United States would retain control of the island. For all three services, bases there played a crucial role in their post-war plans for the defence of the Pacific. The US military, first concerned about Japan as a 'dormant enemy' (p. 65) and then as an undependable ally, found Okinawa to be an indispensable forward base. In the late 1950s, both the president, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, worried that the retention of Okinawa would undermine US-Japanese relations, but the joint chiefs of staff remained adamant about the need for continued US control.

Sarantakes traces with considerable skill the gradual erosion of the military's position. In the United States, the status of Okinawa was primarily an issue within the bureaucracy in Washington; neither the public nor the Congress were ever deeply involved in the debate. But state department officials, along with a series of presidents and secretaries of state, were increasingly worried about the volatile political situation in both Okinawa and Japan. Despite the economic boom brought by massive base construction and the Korean War, Okinawans resented US hegemony, while left-of-centre elements in Japan sought to use the issue as a way to undermine the rule of the Liberal Democratic Party and to destroy the US-Japanese security relationship. As pressure built in the United States, Okinawa, and Japan, the military had to settle for the retention of US bases in an Okinawa that was finally reunited with Japan in May 1972. Sarantakes believes that both states benefited from reversion. 'The Japanese', he writes, 'had reunification with Okinawa, while the Americans preserved the regional political order' (p. 75). Due to compromises by ruling groups on both sides of the Pacific, the security alliance with Japan – the foundation of regional stability – remained intact.

While the book traces the larger contours of the story, it also contains valuable information and penetrating sketches of a series of secondary figures on the American side. The cast includes General Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr., the ill-fated commander of the US invasion forces, Ambassador Edwin Reischauer, far better at public relations than at bureaucratic politics, High Commissioner Paul Caraway, determined to retain US control of Okinawa, and Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, who played a crucial role in the negotiations that finally led to reversion. Although more could be said about the colonial mentality of those who ruled Okinawa, the careful analysis of the interplay between the secondary characters and the presidents whom they served is one of the many strengths of this solid study.

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MARK L. KLEINMAN. *A World of Hope, a World of Fear: Henry A. Wallace, Reinhold Niebuhr, and American Liberalism*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2000. Pp. xvii, 370. \$55.00 (US).

EARLY IN THE recent cinematic reproduction of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, *Thirteen Days*, John F. Kennedy's cabinet mulls what to do upon discovering